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As automated vehicles, personal robots, and other cyberphysical 
systems enter our world, law must confront important questions about civil 
liability for harms caused by these systems. Two legal scholars—one from
Russia and one from the United States—come together to tackle these 
questions with an integrated approach that draws on the law of both 
countries. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The question of who or what is responsible for harms caused by so-
called cyberphysical systems is central to legal scholarship on automation. 
In this Article, two legal scholars who deal directly with robotics on different
sides of the world attempt to add a few logs to the fire of this hot discussion. 
We first synthesize Russian and American perspectives1 and then propose an
Copyright © 2019 Bryant Walker Smith & Andrey Neznamov
* Associate Professor of Law and (by courtesy) Engineering at the University of South Carolina; 
Affiliate Scholar at the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School; Co-Director of the 
Program on Law and Mobility at the University of Michigan Law School. I am especially grateful to 
Christina M. Brown for her outstanding research assistance.
** Ph.D. in Law, Head of the Research Project for Problems of Robotics and AI Regulation in
Russia: Executive Director for AI Regulation at Sherbank; Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of the 
State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In the Russian Federation, the article has been made
possible by and published under RFBR grant 18-29-16015, which is dedicated to the comprehensive study
of legal and ethical aspects of the development and use of artificial intelligence systems.
1. Wherever possible, we try to distinguish between (1) differences between the legal systems of 
the two authors and (2) differences between the individual perspectives of the two authors. Neither of us 
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integrated approach to civil liability based on a given actor’s relationship to
the cyberphysical system and that actor’s culpability for the harm.
II. RUSSIAN AND AMERICAN LAW
It is impossible to consider the issue of liability without considering the 
key features of each country’s legal system and legal institutions. As 
demonstrated in the next section—and for reasons that we cannot fully
explain—the relevant substantive law is strikingly similar between the 
Russian Federation and the United States.2 
Key differences in the practical and procedural context for this 
substantive law nonetheless complicate these similarities. These differences 
implicate the creation, interpretation, implementation, and appreciation of 
law. For example, the legal rules discussed in this article are determined
principally by parliament in the Russian Federation but by a combination of 
courts and legislatures in the various U.S. states (with some intervention by 
the U.S. Congress). Indeed, although this Article frequently cites both 
articles of the Russian Civil Code and sections of American legal
restatements in parallel, these two kinds of sources are not at all comparable.
The Civil Code is binding throughout the Russian Federation, whereas any 
given restatement of the law is at most an influential characterization of legal 
rules prevalent among U.S. states. 
There are other differences as well. For example, unlike a trial in the 
Russian Federation, a trial in the United States may involve a jury of ordinary 
citizens who make factual determinations under the supervision of a judge. 
Panels of judges, however, are typical at the appellate levels in both 
countries. 
In the United States, preparing to try or to otherwise resolve a case
involves discovery, an important but expensive process in which plaintiffs 
and defendants can demand vast amounts of information from each other and 
even from third parties. In the Russian Federation, discovery is merely an
inexpensive formality in which parties might exchange evidence before a 
hearing—though they might also wait to disclose that evidence until a more 
opportune point in the initial litigation.
More generally, the Russian and U.S. systems also differ with respect 
to cost and speed. Litigation in the Russian Federation is generally
considered swift and relatively inexpensive financially. Its other virtues
notwithstanding, civil litigation in the United States is rarely described as 
presumes to speak for our respective country or for our respective community of domestic legal scholars.
2. With apologies for the English language and to the other countries of North and South America, 
we use “American” to refer only to the United States.
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2019] PERSPECTIVES ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR ROBOT HARMS 145 
swift or cheap. Such litigation is not as common in the United States as is
often assumed, but it does underpin an expansive system of private 
settlement that partially mitigates the country’s lack of a robust social safety
net. 
III. OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LIABILITY 
Responsibility can be technical (as in the case of a mechanic who has 
responsibility for maintaining a vehicle), moral (as in the case of a passerby
who has a responsibility to rescue a stranger in distress), or legal. Legal
responsibility can be further divided into obligations (such as driving 
carefully) and liabilities; these are roughly equivalent to primary and 
secondary obligations in international law. Liabilities in turn can be criminal 
(where the actor is fined or imprisoned by the state), administrative (where
the actor merely pays a fine for a minor violation), or civil. 
That brings us finally to civil liability—the legal responsibility of one
party to compensate another for a private wrong or harm. This may also be 
called private liability or noncriminal liability. “Civil” here is used to 
distinguish civil liability from criminal liability. (Confusingly, “civil” can 
also be used to distinguish the codified civil law of continental Europe from
the precedential common law of much of the English-speaking world.) 
Civil liability is generally intended to promote reasonable behavior, to 
compensate the victims of certain harms, and to appropriately channel
retributive desires. This liability is retrospective in that it arises after harm
has occurred. But it is also prospective in that the possibility of liability is 
intended to directly or indirectly influence behavior. In this way, civil
liability is one tool in a larger regulatory toolbox. These other tools— 
including administrative law and criminal law—are often used prior to the
occurrence of harm. For example, in the case of a consumer product, these
legal gateways might include the points at which the product is designed, 
manufactured, sold, resold, used, associated with a danger, updated, or 
disposed of.
A judicial determination of civil liability is often predicated on a 
defendant’s commission of a tort, breach of a contract, sale of a dangerous
product, participation in a dangerous activity, infringement on a property
interest, or violation of a regulatory requirement. 
In the United States, common law has led to considerable overlap
among these categories: Products liability law, for example, is a child of both 
tort law and contract law. In the Russian Federation, civil law has created
clearer boundaries between these categories, but a single harm can
nonetheless implicate several of them.
There are significant differences among and even within these 
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categories of civil liability. Consider two key examples: culpability and 
damages. 
The relationship between culpability and liability continues to 
challenge legislatures and courts in the Russian Federation and the United
States (among many other countries).3 In tort law, culpability—fault—is 
central, even though it is neither sufficient nor, in some cases, even necessary
for tort liability. Russian civil codes since 1922 have included a fault-based 
liability provision, which currently states that: 
A person who has not performed an obligation or who has performed it
improperly shall bear liability in case of fault (intent or negligence), except
for instances where a law or contract provides for other grounds for
liability. A person is recognized as being not at fault if with the degree of 
care and caution that was required of him by the nature of the obligation
and the conditions of commerce, the person took all measures to properly 
perform the obligation.4 
In Russia, fault is a subjective condition of legal responsibility
expressing the offender’s attitude to her own wrongful conduct and its 
consequences. Fault has a very specific nature as a condition for liability in 
civil law, which deals with specific relations mostly based on goods and 
money5—as well as with personal injury. This leads to the primacy of the
compensatory and remedial functions of civil liability. Indeed, as in the 
United States, a party’s subjective attitude generally does not affect
compensation.6 This explains why the type of fault is less important—and 
why in some cases there is no need to establish fault at all. 
Although scholars disagree on its early history,7 fault-based liability is 
also a cornerstone of modern American tort law. For example, unreasonable 
conduct is one of the four or five elements of a typical negligence claim. 
These elements are duty (an obligation owed by the defendant), breach 
(unreasonable conduct by the defendant), cause-in-fact (contribution of the 
3. See, e.g., infra Section IV (discussing evolution of strict liability in products liability in the
United States).
 4. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 401(1) (Russ.). 
5. SUKHANOV YE.A., 1 ROSSIYSKOYE GRAZHDANSKOYE PRAVO: V 2  T. OBSHCHAYA CHAST’.
VESHCHNOYE PRAVO. NASLEDSTVENNOYE PRAVO. INTELLEKTUAL’NYYE PRAVA. LICHNYYE 
NEIMUSHCHESTVENNYYE PRAVA: UCHEBNIK [E.A. SUKHANOV, RUSSIAN CIVIL LAW IN TWO VOLUMES,
GENERAL PART, RIGHTS IN REM. PROBATE LAW. INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS. PERSONAL NON-PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK] (2d ed. 2011) (paraphrased from the original Russian) (in the original Cyrillic, 
СУХАНОВ Е.А., РОССИЙСКОЕ ГРАЖДАНСКОЕ ПРАВО: В 2 Т. ОБЩАЯ ЧАСТЬ. ВЕЩНОЕ ПРАВО.
НАСЛЕДСТВЕННОЕ ПРАВО. ИНТЕЛЛЕКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ПРАВА. ЛИЧНЫЕ НЕИМУЩЕСТВЕННЫЕ ПРАВА:
УЧЕБНИК).
 6. Id. (paraphrased from the original Russian). 
7. Compare, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671,
700 (2008), with John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 1733, 1761 n.104 (1998).
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2019] PERSPECTIVES ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR ROBOT HARMS 147 
breach to harm suffered by the plaintiff), scope of liability (the exclusion of 
pragmatic limits on liability), and damages (elements of the harm that are 
recognized by law). 
Despite the importance of culpability, even tort law has exceptions
involving strict liability for innocent conduct, and liability without fault is 
often the rule rather than the exception in other categories of civil liability.
For the reasons discussed below, these instances in which reasonable 
conduct can result in liability are especially important to robot law. We 
return later in the Article to eight key instances:8 
1. Breach of a contract.9 
2. Misrepresentation.10 
3. Violation of certain laws (in some U.S. states).11 
4. Sale of a defective product (in the Russian Federation and most 
U.S. states).12 
5. Provision of a defective service (in the Russian Federation).13 
6. Participation in certain abnormally dangerous activities.14 
8. There are other exceptions as well. In the Russian Federation, for example, strict liability can
apply to professional bailees for damage to a thing. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK 
RF] [Civil Code] art. 901. Harm caused to an individual as a result of illegal conviction, illegal criminal
prosecution, illegal use of confinement under guard or recognizance not to leave, or illegal imposition of
administrative liability in the form of administrative arrest as a measure of restraint, and also harm caused
to a legal entity as a result of administrative prosecution in the form of administrative suspension of 
activity. Id. art. 1070. In the United States, for example, a person who intentionally enters another 
person’s land that she mistakenly but reasonably believes to be her own can nonetheless be liable for 
trespass. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
9. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 401(3) 
(entrepreneurial activity); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 11, intro. note (AM. LAW INST.
1981).
 10. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 178; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
11. Under a strict approach to negligence per se followed by some U.S. states, the violation of a 
law is irrefutably unreasonable (such that a bleeding defendant driving above the speed limit in order to
reach a hospital could be liable for a crash caused by that speeding). Cf.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
 12. Compare GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1095 
with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM. LAW. INST. 1998). 
13. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1095. Although
strict liability does not generally apply to services in the United States, some U.S. states do hold some
transport providers and other common carriers to a standard of utmost care under which even “slight” 
negligence can result in liability. Compare, e.g., Eskew v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 958 N.E.2d 
426 (Ill. App. 2011) (imposing a higher standard of care) with Bethel v. New York City Transit Auth., 92
N.Y.2d 348 (N.Y. 1998) (rejecting a higher standard of care); see also, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Is Uber a
Common Carrier?, 12 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 135, 146 (2015) (discussing the classification
of broadband access).
 14. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1079(1); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). Whereas
SMITH NEZNAMOV FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/21/2019 10:38 AM      
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
        
  
 
  
   
     
   
 
 
       
148 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 30:141
7. Harm by certain animals under the defendant’s control.15 
8. Tortious conduct by an employee or other agent.16 
The relationship between compensation and liability is equally 
complex. Consistent with its compensatory rationale, civil liability 
nominally seeks complete restoration of a violated right. In some instances,
however, a contract between parties or a legal rule of more general 
application may limit recovery. For example, both Russian and American
law permit certain limitations on contractual damages, and many U.S. states 
reduce the compensation awarded to a plaintiff whose own unreasonable 
conduct contributed to her harm. In other instances, law may provide for 
increased damages. For example, in the Russian Federation, law or contract
can increase the liability of a carrier for harm caused to the life or health of 
a passenger compared to ordinary rules of the Civil Code,17 and U.S. states 
generally permit punitive damages for reckless or intentionally harmful 
conduct.18 
Even where law contemplates full compensation, reality often hinders 
it. In the United States, lawsuits can be deterred by litigation costs and other
practical challenges, barred by arbitration clauses, impeded by evidentiary
limitations, and tempered by settlements that result in only partial
compensation—and even then, legal fees can significantly reduce the
amount that an injured victim ultimately receives from any award or
settlement. 
These principles are important as we turn to harms caused by robots. 
For our purposes, a cyberphysical system is a combination of software and
hardware that can act in and on the physical environment. A robot is a 
cyberphysical system with some nominally discrete physical form and some
the Russian Federation explicitly identifies “means of transport” as one of these abnormally dangerous 
activities, GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1079(1), most U.S.
states do not apply this doctrine to the use of regular motor vehicles. The U.S. state of Florida does apply 
a “dangerous instrumentality doctrine” to motor vehicles. See, e.g., Burch v. Sun State Ford, Inc., 864 So.
2d 466 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine applies even when an 
operator is involved in intentional misconduct, unless the operator makes weapon-like use of the vehicle 
with the intent to cause physical harm).
 15. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 21–23 (AM. LAW INST. 
2010). In Russia, animals are subject to the same legal regime as property, GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS
ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 137, and the owner is responsible for non-contractual 
harm caused by her property, id. art. 209.
 16. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1068; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 7.01–7.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
 17. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 800. In the United 
States, many states also impose heightened obligations on common carriers. Cf. Kevin Werbach, supra
note 13, at 146 (discussing policy considerations regarding whether to apply legal obligations to newer 
network-based services).
 18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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2019] PERSPECTIVES ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR ROBOT HARMS 149 
degree of what is commonly if controversially called autonomy.19 An 
automated motor vehicle is one example of a robot.20 
IV. PRIOR SCHOLARSHIP 
While much English-language scholarship has considered the civil
liability implications of increasing automation and connectivity, these issues 
are only beginning to gain attention in Russian-language scholarship.
Relevant articles collectively address several overlapping topics. First, some
deal squarely with civil liability for harms caused by cyberphysical
systems.21 Second, some analyze civil liability for artificial intelligence 
generally, with or without a physical embodiment.22 Third, at least in the 
19. On automation and autonomy, see, for example, SAE INT’L, SAE J3016: TAXONOMY AND
DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO DRIVING AUTOMATION SYSTEMS FOR ON-ROAD MOTOR
VEHICLES 28 (2018) (discussing the different and evolving definitions of “autonomous” and “autonomy”
and the challenges these present for consistent application to automated driving systems); THOMAS B.
SHERIDAN, TELEROBOTICS, AUTOMATION, AND HUMAN SUPERVISORY CONTROL 260 (1992) (defining
multiple levels of automation in automobiles). Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEF. SCI. BD., TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS 31 (2012) (addressing the muddled understandings 
of autonomy by using the terms “robot” to refer to physical automations of repetitive processes and 
“unmanned system” to refer to “mobile robots” that combine physical systems with artificial intelligence).
20. The technically preferred term is “automated driving system.” See SAE INT’L, supra note 19,
at 3 (defining “Automated Driving System” as the hardware and software that are collectively capable of
performing sustained dynamic driving tasks). However, “automated vehicle” is a commonly accepted
term. See, e.g., Rep. of the Global Forum for Road Traffic Safety, Rep. of the Inland Transp. Comm. on
Its Seventy-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc. ECE/Trans/WP.1/165 (Oct. 3, 2018) (using the term in the title
of a nonbinding resolution on the subject attached to the conference report); National Conf. of Comm’rs
on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Automated Operation of Vehicles Act § 2(5) (2019) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://heinonline.org/HOL/Contents?handle=hein.nccusl/nccpub4477&id=1&size=2&
index=&collection=nccusl (defining “[a]utomated vehicle” as a “motor vehicle with an automated driving 
system”); U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF TRANSPORTATION: AUTOMATED 
VEHICLES 3.0 (2018) (using the term throughout the report as well as in its title). 
21. See, e.g., Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Application of Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied 
Machine Intelligence, in ROBOT LAW 51, 51 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016); Ryan Abbott, The Reasonable 
Computer: Disrupting the Paradigm of Tort Liability, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2018); Andrea 
Bertolini, Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic Applications and Liability
Rules, 5 L. INNOVATION & TECH. 214, 247 (2013); F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: 
Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1872 (2014); Christina Mulligan, 
Revenge Against Robots, 69 S.C. L. REV. 579, 593–94 (2018); Neznamov A.V., Pravila bespilotnogo 
vozhdeniya: ob izmeneniyakh Venskoy konventsii o dorozhnom dvizhenii [Rules of Unmanned Driving:
Towards Changes to the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic], 1 ZAKON 175 (2018) (in the original
Cyrillic, Незнамов А.В., Правила беспилотного вождения: об изменениях Венской конвенции о
дорожном движении); Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 398 (2016); David C. Vladeck, 
Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 150 
(2014); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots 107–08 (Stanford Law Sch. Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 523, 2018), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3223621.  
22. E.g., WOODROW BARFIELD & UGO PAGOLLO, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2018) (ebook); MORKHAT P.M., ISKUSSTVENNYY INTELLEKT: PRAVOVOY
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United States, much attention has focused on the specific case of automated
driving.23 Fourth, some scholarship has considered liability as part of a
broader discussion of regulation.24 Fifth, academic debates about legal 
personhood for robots have consumed considerable time and space.25 
VZGLYAD [ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: LEGAL VIEW] (2017) (in the original Cyrillic, МОРХАM П.М.,
ИСКУССТВЕННЫЙ ИНТЕЛЛЕКТ: ПРАВОВОЙ ВЗГЛЯД); Gurko A., Iskusstvennyy intellekt i avtorskoye 
pravo: vzglyad v budushcheye [Artificial Intelligence and Copyright: A Look Into the Future], 12 IS.
AVTORSKOYE PRAVO I SMEZHNYYE PRAVA. 7–18 (2017) (in the original Cyrillic, Гурко А.,
Искусственный интеллект и авторское право: взгляд в будущее); Paulius Čerka et al., Liability for 
Damages Caused by Artificial Intelligence, 31 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 376 (2015); Jane R.
Bambauer, Dr. Robot, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383 (2017); James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate 
Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657 (2016); Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 GEO. L.J.
1777 (2014); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt: Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and 
Accountability in the 3A Era—The Human-Like Authors Are Already Here—A New Model, 2017 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 659 (2017).
 23. See, e.g., NIDHI KALRA ET AL., RAND CORP., LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES 17 (2009); JOHN VILLASENOR, BROOKINGS INST., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
DRIVERLESS CARS: ISSUES AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR LEGISLATION 2 (2014); Stephen S. Wu, 
Product Liability Issues in the U.S. and Associated Risk Management, in  AUTONOMES FAHREN 575 
(Markus Maurer et al. eds., 2015); Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort
Law and Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241 (2012); Kenneth S. Abraham &
Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal
Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L. REV. 127 (2019); Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous
Vehicles: State Tort Liability, Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 
1611 (2018); Jeffrey K. Gurney, Sue My Car Not Me: Products Liability and Accidents Involving 
Autonomous Vehicles, 2013 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 247 (2013); Hubbard, supra note 21; Gary E.
Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability
System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321 (2012); Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product 
Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1.
 24. See, e.g., NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS. REGULATORY LANDSCAPE. WORLD EXPERIENCE IN THE 
REGULATION OF ROBOTICS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGIES (Andrey V. Neznamov ed., 
2018); Bibi van den Berg, Robots as Tools for Techno-Regulation, 3 LAW, INNOVATION & TECH. 317,
325 (2011); Tomoko Nambu, Legal Regulations and Public Policies for Next-Generation Robots in 
Japan, 31 AI & SOC’Y 483, 486 (2016); Neznamov A.V. & Naumov V.B., Strategiya regulirovaniya
robototekhniki i kiberfizicheskikh sistem [Regulation Strategy of Robotics and Cyber-Physical Systems],
2 ZAKON. (2018) (in the original Cyrillic, Незнамов А.В., Наумов В.Б. Стратегия регулирования
робототехники и киберфизических систем); Neznamov A.V. & Naumov V.B., Voprosy razvitiya 
zakonodatel’stva o robototekhnike v Rossii i v mire [Issues of Development of Legislation on Robotics in
Russia and in the World], 8 YURIDICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA 14 (2017) (in the original Cyrillic, 
Незнамов А.В., Наумов В.Б. Вопросы развития законодательства о робототехнике в России и в
мире); Nicolas Petit, Law and Regulation of Artificial Intelligence and Robots—Conceptual Framework
and Normative Implications (Mar. 9, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2931339; Adam D. Thierer et al., Artificial Intelligence and Public Policy
(Aug.17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/thierer-artificial-
intelligence-policy-mr-mercatus-v1.pdf.  
25. See, e.g., Arkhipov V.V. & Naumov V.B., O nekotorykh voprosakh teoreticheskikh osnovaniy 
razvitiya zakonodatel’stva o robototekhnike: aspekty voli i pravosub”yektnosti [On Some Issues of the
Theoretical Foundations of the Development of Legislation on Robotics: Aspects of the Will and Legal
Personality], 5 ZAKON 157 (2017) (in the original Cyrillic, Архипов В.В., Наумов В.Б. О некоторых
вопросах теоретических оснований развития законодательства о робототехнике: аспекты воли
и правосубъектности); Ignacio N. Cofone, Servers and Waiters: What Matters in the Law of A.I., 21 
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Finally, some articles have addressed specific procedural issues related to 
cyberphysical systems.26 The substantial literature on automation in armed 
conflict is outside our scope. 
V. LIABILITY FOR CYBERPHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
Robots and other cyberphysical systems fit well into the existing 
framework of civil liability, but some theoretical and practical questions 
have yet to be answered definitively—and perhaps cannot or should not be 
answered so early.27 
Legislatures and courts will necessarily develop law alongside 
changing technologies and evolving social norms. This is true in both 
countries. For example, even in the Russian Federation, the Civil Code does 
not attempt an exhaustive list of abnormally dangerous activities, relying 
instead on an illustrative list followed by “etc.” (и т.п.; и др.). In the United 
States, judges and juries constantly revisit the dynamically robust concept of 
reasonableness that is central to civil liability, for what was reasonable two
hundred or even two years ago may not be reasonable today. So too with 
foreseeability: A reasonable actor is generally expected to take precautions 
with respect to only those risks that are foreseeable, but more is arguably 
becoming foreseeable and even foreseen.28 
Regardless of how cyberphysical systems develop, they will almost 
certainly continue to cause some harms even as they prevent others. Airbags, 
which protect far more people than they seriously injure, provide a hopeful 
STANFORD TECH. L. REV. 167 (2018); Ibragimov R. & Suragina E., Pravo mashin. Kak privlech’ robata
k otvetstvennosti? [Right Machines: How to Bring the Robot to Justice?], 11 KORPORATIVNYY YURIST
(2017) (in the original Cyrillic, Ибрагимов Р., Сурагина Е. Право машин. Как привлечь робота к
ответственности? 11 КОРПОРАТИВНЫЙ ЮРИСТ); S.M. Solaiman, Legal Personality of Robots, 
Corporations, Idols and Chimpanzees: A Quest for Legitimacy, 25 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE L. 155,
161 (2017); Horst G.M. Eidenmueller, The Rise of Robots and the Law of Humans (Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 27/2017, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941001;
Filipe Maia Alexandre, The Legal Status of Artificially Intelligent Robots: Personhood, Taxation and 
Control (June 1, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2985466; Katherine Sheriff, Defining Autonomy in the Context of Tort Liability: Is Machine Learning
Indicative of Robotic Responsibility? (Dec. 12, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2735945.
 26. E.g., Bernard Dickens & Rebecca J. Cook, Legal and Ethical Issues in Telemedicine and
Robotics, 94 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 73 (2006); V.A. Laptev, Otvetstvennost’
“buduschego”: pravovoye sushchestvo I vopros otsenki dokazatel’stv [Responsibility of the “Future”: 
The Legal Essence and the Issue of Evaluation of Evidence], 3 GRAZHDANSKOYE PRAVO 32–35 (2017)
(in the original Cyrillic, Лаптев В.А., Ответственность “будущего”: правовое существо и вопрос
оценки доказательств).
 27. See Hubbard, supra note 21, at 1872 (arguing criticisms of robotic developments based on 
potential injuries ignored that the legal scheme had successfully balanced innovation and safety). 
28.  David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277, 1307 (2009).
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example of this phenomenon.29 Thalidomide, a drug for morning sickness
which caused death or severe injury in children born to the women who took
it, offers a more cautionary tale.30 And yet both examples are more complex:
Earlier airbags killed children and lighter-weight adults for which they were 
not designed,31 and thalidomide still has important uses today.32 
In other words, it is essential to consider products not in isolation but
rather as part of the systems in which they are actually used.33 This systems 
approach also suggests that the safety of emerging technologies may depend 
on many different human and corporate actors, including their developers, 
manufacturers, owners, deployers, and users as well as on others within their
environment.34 When failures occur, some or all these actors may incur civil 
liability based in part on their levels of control over, culpability for, and 
contributions to the resulting harms. 
Let us begin, however, by comparing the performance of just the 
manufacturer with the performance of the cyberphysical system itself under 
both the Civil Code in the Russian Federation and principles of products
liability in the United States. A manufacturer that intentionally or even 
recklessly causes harm will easily face civil liability (and, in the United
States, possibly even criminal liability).35 For this reason, the lower levels of
culpability—negligence and even innocent conduct—are much more 
interesting. 
The concept of reasonableness is essential to understanding American 
approaches to these lower levels of culpability. Indeed, reasonableness is one 
of the most fundamental concepts in American law. Over the last century,
myriad case verdicts, judicial opinions, pieces of legislation, restatements of
the law, and law review articles have endeavored to develop or apply some 
notion of reasonableness. Broadly speaking: A person is negligent if she fails
to behave as a reasonable person would under the same circumstances, a 
29. See Richard Kent et al., The Field Performance of Frontal Air Bags: A Review of the Literature, 
6 TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION 1 (Mar. 2005), for a general discussion of airbag effectiveness.
 30. See ROCK BRYNNER & TRENT STEPHENS, DARK REMEDY: THE IMPACT OF THALIDOMIDE AND 
ITS REVIVAL AS A VITAL MEDICINE (2001), for a general discussion of the rise, fall, and subsequent rise 
again of thalidomide.
 31. See generally Kent et al., supra note 29.
 32. See BRYNNER & STEPHENS, supra note 30 (discussing modern uses for thalidomide). 
33. See Bryant Walker Smith, Lawyers and Engineers Should Speak the Same Robot Language, in
ROBOT LAW 78, 78 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016).
34.  For example, a human or other legal entity might specify high-level goals for the robot, design
it to meet those goals, manufacture it, program it, calibrate it, test it, approve it, market it, supervise it (or 
fail to do so), provide data to it, update it, modify it, instruct it, inform it, own it, use it, damage it, take 
information from it, take instruction from it, otherwise interact with it, and so on. 
35. In both the Russian Federation and the United States, individual employees could also be
criminally prosecuted for their unlawful acts. 
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manufacturer is negligent if it fails to act as a reasonable manufacturer
would, and a product is defective if it does not perform as a reasonable 
product would.36 
Russian civil liability law embraces reasonableness as a concept but not 
as a term. For example, one could say that a reasonable person would act 
“with the degree of care and caution that was required of him by the nature
of the obligation and the conditions of commerce.”37 Similarly, one could
say that a product has a “defect” if, for example, it includes “unreliable or
insufficient information.”38 In Russia, lawyers traditionally identify one’s
actions as lawful or unlawful rather than as reasonable or unreasonable—but 
this is a minor distinction for this comparative analysis. Accordingly, in the
discussion that follows, we use terms related to reasonableness to broadly
encompass the approaches in both countries.
Consider four scenarios that each result in physical harm:
1. The manufacturer acts reasonably, and the cyberphysical 
system performs reasonably.
2. The manufacturer acts unreasonably, and the cyberphysical 
system performs unreasonably.
3. The manufacturer acts unreasonably, but the cyberphysical 
system performs reasonably. 
4. The manufacturer acts reasonably, but the cyberphysical
system performs unreasonably.
The first scenario is straightforward: Unreasonable performance by the
manufacturer or its product was not present and therefore could not be a but-
for cause of the harm. For example, if a truck swerves at the last minute into 
an automated vehicle, that vehicle cannot overcome the laws of physics to 
prevent the collision. As in each of the four scenarios, the manufacturer could 
be liable under a theory of misrepresentation if it had made an incorrect claim 
about the performance of its cyberphysical system. Otherwise, only under a 
theory of absolute or enterprise liability would the manufacturer be liable for 
harm from the collision itself, and courts in the United States and in Russia 
have not recognized such a theory. 
The second scenario is also relatively straightforward, but the result is 
different: Unreasonable performance by the manufacturer and unreasonable 
36. Of course, these broad statements elide considerable complexity and controversy in both tort
law and products liability law. The discussion of the fourth example, infra, hints at just some of this 
nuance.
 37. GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 401(1). 
38. See, e.g., GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] art. 1095; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (AM. LAW. INST. 1998). American
approaches to informational and warning defects are similar. 
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performance by its product are both probably but-for causes of the harm. For
example, an automated vehicle might swerve into a truck that it failed to
recognize under ordinary environmental conditions that the manufacturer 
should have anticipated. Here, the manufacturer would likely be liable under
the theories of negligence and design defect that are common to both the
Russian Federation and the United States. 
The third scenario becomes more interesting. Reasonable performance 
by the cyberphysical system itself would seem to undermine a claim that the 
manufacturer’s unreasonableness was a but-for cause of the harm. Again,
imagine that there is no way that the automated vehicle could avoid the 
swerving truck. Nonetheless, the manufacturer may still conceivably have 
some civil liability in both the Russian Federation and the United States. The 
manufacturer may have misrepresented the safety of its vehicle by saying,
for example, that it was crash-proof. Or its design of the software may have 
been so sloppy that a judge or jury may conclude that this sloppiness must
have contributed in some subtle way to the crash. Indeed, this is a possible 
interpretation of one of the larger verdicts in the United States against Toyota 
during its sudden unintended acceleration debacle.39 
The fourth scenario is the most interesting in part because of its 
important past, complicated present, and potential future in American
products liability law. An early case in the development of this law arguably
involved such a scenario: Even if a soda producer had reasonably inspected
the bottles that it filled with its soda, it was still liable for injuries that resulted 
when one of those bottles exploded because of an unidentified (and possibly 
unidentifiable) fracture.40 This strict liability—that is, liability without
fault—then expanded from manufacturing defects to products liability more 
generally as some courts held manufacturers liable for failing to design or
warn against unreasonable risks that they could not have foreseen when they
sold their ultimately dangerous products. However, this was largely a short-
lived expansion, and most states now determine the reasonableness of a 
design or warning by reference to those risks that were foreseeable at the
time of sale.
In some ways, however, cyberphysical systems evoke the old exploding 
bottle from American law. Even a manufacturer that takes all reasonable 
steps may nonetheless produce a cyberphysical system that ultimately 
interacts with our complex world in a way that is unreasonable. This
eventuality is broadly foreseeable even if the particular failure is not.41 An 
39. Verdict, Agreement, and Settlement, Bookout v. Toyota Motor Sales USA Inc., No. CJ-2008-
7969, 2013 WL 5596110 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Oct. 28, 2013).
40.  Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 461 (Cal. 1944). 
41. Cf. Owen, supra note 28, at 1307 (“[F]oreseeability is an explicit, central consideration in 
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automated vehicle manufacturer may simulate billions of kilometers of travel
and yet miss specific sunlight conditions that ultimately lead its vehicle to
swerve into the truck. And in this way a crash results from an unreasonable
cyberphysical system produced by a reasonable manufacturer.
While generally not described in these terms, this combination of 
reasonable manufacturer and unreasonable product seems to generate the 
most speculation about the future of civil liability. In an extreme example, a 
manufacturer develops an artificially intelligent system that designs an 
artificially intelligent cyberphysical system that adapts as it learns from 
interactions in the physical world. At some point, the connection between
manufacturer and product becomes so attenuated that the twin principles of 
reasonableness and foreseeability that are central to civil liability lose their
relevance. 
There are many potential responses to this concern. One response could 
involve simply expanding what it means for a manufacturer to act 
reasonably, especially with respect to supervising and updating products
after they have been sold.42 Most physical systems of the last century cannot 
be remotely monitored or updated, and physical changes to these systems are 
often expensive if not impossible. But improving at minimum the software 
on a cyberphysical system may be easier—as well as critically important in 
the face of evolving cybersecurity risks. If undertaking these updates is 
reasonable, then a manufacturer that fails to do so may be liable for harm
that results from that failure. 
Another response could involve a renewed embrace of strict products 
liability without regard to the reasonableness of the design process or the
foreseeability of the risk. Under this rule, a manufacturer would be liable for 
harm caused by the unreasonable performance of its cyberphysical system
even if it could not have foreseen the specific risk. Alternatively, judges and
juries may simply take an expansive view of foreseeability by determining 
that a manufacturer should have anticipated almost anything.43 After all, in a
world where technology titans warn about human extinction or enslavement 
at the hands of artificial intelligence, would anything less really be a
surprise?
Civil liability could also evolve through other longstanding legal 
principles that emphasize what one of us calls trustworthiness.44 In the 
evaluating whether a person’s conduct should be blamed.”).
 42. See Smith, supra note 22, at 1820 (discussing reasonable mechanisms that could be put into
place to make products safer). 
43. See Owen, supra note 28, at 1307 (explaining that it would be a mistake to narrow the role of 
judges and juries when it comes to determining foreseeability). 
44. BRYANT WALKER SMITH, THE TRUSTWORTHY COMPANY (forthcoming 2019).
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United States, special kinds of actors—fiduciaries, common carriers, and 
public service companies—generally have heightened obligations to their 
customers or to the public. The companies that manufacture or deploy 
cyberphysical systems may increasingly fall into, or at least close to, these
categories. For example, some industries may shift from selling products to 
selling services to consumers, including services like transportation that are
historically associated with common carrier liability. Some companies may
even voluntarily act more like insurers, rather than merely manufacturers, of 
their cyberphysical systems. 
Actors other than the manufacturer may additionally or alternatively be 
civilly liable for harms caused by cyberphysical systems. Let us turn to the 
user of such a system and again consider four scenarios that each result in
physical harm to someone other than the user herself: 
1. The user acts reasonably, and the cyberphysical system
performs reasonably.
2. The user acts unreasonably, and the cyberphysical system 
performs unreasonably.
3. The user acts unreasonably, but the cyberphysical system
performs reasonably.
4. The user acts reasonably, but the cyberphysical system
performs unreasonably.
Whereas the corresponding scenario was unlikely to result in liability
for the manufacturer, the first user scenario could result in civil liability for 
the user—at least in the Russian Federation. This is because, at least initially,
the use of some cyberphysical systems could conceivably be treated as an
abnormally dangerous activity—either because the same activity would be
considered abnormally dangerous if done by a human (as in the case of 
driving) or because it would independently satisfy relevant criteria. In the 
Russian Federation, these criteria could include use of an object that poses 
an increased danger for others45 because it cannot be fully controlled.46 
45. Krasavchikov O.A., 2 KATEGORII NAUKI GRAZHDANSKOGO PRAVA: IZBRANNYYE TRUDY 
[CATEGORIES OF THE SCIENCE OF CIVIL LAW: SELECTED WORKS] 317 (2005) (in the original Cyrillic, 
Красавчиков О.А., Категории науки гражданского права: Избранные труды); 3 POSTATEYNYY 
KOMMENTARIY K GRAZHDANSKOMU KODEKSU ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII [AN ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE 
COMMENTARY TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CIVIL CODE], pt. 2 (P.V. Krasheninnikov et al. eds. 2011) 
(quoting 2 SOVETSKOYE GRAZHDANSKOYE PARVO: UCHEBNIK [SOVIET CIVIL LAW: A TEXTBOOK] 38 (O.
A. Krasavchikov et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985) (in the original Cyrillic, Советское гражданское право: 
Учебник)) [hereinafter COMMENTARY] (in the original Cyrillic, Постатейный комментарий к
Гражданскому кодексу Российской Федерации, части второй).
46. The term “source of increased danger” is still being discussed. It could include both the 
“concept of activity” (an activity as a source of increased danger) and the “concept of the object” (a 
material object as a source of increased danger). Id.
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The second scenario is initially straightforward. The user may have, for 
example, unreasonably neglected to maintain the cyberphysical system or
unreasonably deployed it in conditions for which it was not designed. If her 
unreasonable conduct was a but-for cause of the harm, then she would likely 
be liable. However, this scenario is complicated by the potential liability of 
the manufacturer. In the United States, the law of joint and several liability
varies widely among the various states, but its application to a cyberphysical 
system does not seem to present particularly novel issues.
The third scenario is similar. The user is probably liable, and—per the
earlier discussion—the manufacturer is probably not.
The fourth scenario is again the most interesting and perhaps the most
uncertain. As a reasonable actor, the user is not directly liable for any 
negligence. However, as in the first scenario, the user could conceivably be 
liable for undertaking an abnormally dangerous activity. In this scenario,
other bases for strict liability may also be available, either directly or by 
analogy. In many U.S. states, the owner of a vehicle is civilly liable for the 
negligence of another person who drives that vehicle with her permission. In
both the Russian Federation and the United States, a legislature or court
could hold the owner of an automated vehicle liable by similarly treating the 
vehicle’s automated driving system as a permissive driver.47 It could also
analogize the cyberphysical system to a dangerous condition on land or to a
wild animal.48 Alternatively, it could hold the user vicariously liable by 
treating the cyberphysical system as her agent acting in the scope of that 
agency,49 similar to how electronic agents can already bind their users in
contract law.50 In this way, the user would be liable for the unreasonable 
performance of the cyberphysical system just as an employer would be liable 
for the unreasonable performance of its employee.51 
This possibility must be clearly and emphatically distinguished from
the superficially similar argument that, like corporations, cyberphysical
systems themselves should be legal persons subject to legal liability. Strict 
47. See, e.g., Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018, c. 18, (Gr. Brit.); HILARY ROWEN, UNIF.
LAW COMM’N DRAFTING COMM. ON HIGHLY AUTOMATED VEHICLES, NOTE TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
AND OBSERVERS ON INSURANCE PROVISIONS (2018).
 48. See, e.g., Richard Kelley et al., Liability in Robotics: An International Perspective on Robots
as Animals, 24 ADVANCED ROBOTICS 1861 (2010) (proposing a framework to treat Robots as animals
when determining legal liability).
 49. Hubbard, supra note 21, at 1862.
 50. See  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 6.01–6.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (stating that a 
contract made with an agent is binding).
51. It is conceivable that the reverse could also apply: A human could be an agent for a 
cyberphysical system. But in that case, for the reasons discussed in the paragraphs that follow, it would
be unlikely for the agency relationship—and inappropriate for civil liability—to stop at the cyberphysical
system.
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liability does not require legal personhood; while human employees are 
obviously both actual and legal persons, the same is not generally true of
animals, real property, or electronic agents. Indeed, legal personhood is more 
closely associated with limiting liability (through the corporate form) than
with expanding liability (through principal-agent relationships). This is true 
in both the Russian Federation and the United States. 
More fundamentally, in the view of our American author, there are at 
least two reasons why legal personhood for cyberphysical systems is not 
sensible as a way of addressing civil liability.52 First, unlike humans or even 
corporations that can be clearly delineated and distinguished, cyberphysical
systems are not necessarily discrete. Consider a single hypothetical 
automated vehicle. It could be one cyberphysical system. But it could also 
be a thousand cyberphysical systems, where each system corresponds to a 
different electronic control unit. Or, someday, it could be one one-millionth 
of a cyberphysical system made up of all the automated vehicles that are
digitally connected to their manufacturer. Just as the Internet is a network of 
networks, an artificial intelligence super unit could be a network of different 
artificial intelligence subunits. This systems boundary problem makes legal 
personhood impractical. 
Second, legal personhood is not helpful. Return to the goals of civil
liability with which this article began. A cyberphysical system can be made
safer simply by directly changing its programming or calibrating its 
training—not by fining it or putting it in jail. A robot has no external 
resources with which to compensate those who are injured by it, and 
insurance does not require personhood. Finally, as personally satisfying as it
may be to physically destroy a machine that has caused harm, such
inefficient destruction would harken back to the notorious animal trials that 
may have taken place centuries ago.53 
In contrast, an expansion of first-party insurance, third-party insurance,
and the social safety net could help to promote the goals of safety and 
compensation. By setting rates based on risk, liability insurance could
encourage manufacturers, owners, and users to act reasonably—and to
ensure that compensation is available when harm does occur. A similar
approach has already been adopted in the United Kingdom54 and is being
52.  We recognize a small difference of opinion in this paragraph and the next. Our Russian author
would take a slightly more sympathetic position toward the argument that cyberphysical systems could
in theory be legal persons subject to legal liability should the need arise. Our American author
emphatically would not. When the machines rise, our Russian author will put in a good word for our 
American author.
 53. See SADAKAT KADRI, THE TRIAL: A HISTORY FROM SOCRATES TO O.J. SIMPSON 146–59
(2005) (discussing several historical examples).
 54. See Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018, c. 18, § 2 (Gr. Brit.) (describing the imposition 
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considered in the United States.55 In addition, first-party insurance or 
equivalent social programs could directly compensate those who are harmed.
We therefore return to the humans and other legal entities— 
manufacturers, users, and others—for which civil liability is appropriate. At
a policy level, the parliament and to a limited extent courts (in the Russian
Federation) and both legislatures and courts (in the United States) may 
ultimately be faced with a decision about where to draw the line between
liability and no liability for harm caused by a cyberphysical system. Based 
on the previous discussion, there are five possibilities for the minimum 
culpability necessary to impose civil liability on an actor for harm caused by
a cyberphysical system:
1. The actor intends to and does cause harm through the 
cyberphysical system.
2. The actor recklessly causes harm through the cyberphysical 
system.
3. The actor negligently causes harm through the cyberphysical 
system.
4. The cyberphysical system causes harm through its
unreasonable performance. 
5. The cyberphysical system causes harm (regardless of whether
its performance was reasonable). 
Different rules are possible and different legal bases are available for 
different kinds of actors. For example, one potential framework for civil 
liability based on role and culpability could look like the following:56 
of liability for damages caused by insured and uninsured automated vehicles).
 55. See National Conf. of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Automated Operation of 
Vehicles Act § 3 cmt. (2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://heinonline.org/HOL/Contents?
handle=hein.nccusl/nccpub4477&id=1&size=2&index=&collection=nccusl (clarifying that existing 
state vehicle laws regarding insurance would apply to automated vehicles).
56. We do not reference the “owner” of a cyberphysical system because of the ambiguity of this
term, particularly in the context of cyberphysical systems encompassing onboard and offboard elements
subject to complex assertions of property rights. 
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Culpability
Role
Third 
party
User Maintainer Developer Deployer Insurer
1. Intent Liability Liability Liability Liability Liability Liability
2. Recklessness Liability Liability Liability Liability Liability Liability
3. Negligence
No 
liability 
Liability Liability Liability Liability Liability
4. Unreasonable 
system
No 
liability 
No 
liability 
No 
liability 
Liability Liability Liability
5. Any harm
No 
liability 
No 
liability 
No 
liability 
No 
liability 
No 
liability 
Liability
This example could reflect a cautious approach by legislators or judges
to cyberphysical systems. Under a deviation from the rule of negligence, a
third party—an individual who interacts with but does not actually use a 
cyberphysical system operating in a public space—might be shielded from 
liability for conduct that is merely unreasonable. Such a rule could be based
on a lack of behavioral norms toward these systems, on a desire to increase
their acceptance, or on an expectation that they should mitigate the 
carelessness of others. Under a rule of negligence, an individual user or a 
maintainer might be liable for their own unreasonable behavior but not 
directly liable for the unreasonable behavior of the system itself. Under a 
rule of strict liability, a commercial developer or a deployer of such a system
might be liable for harm resulting from the system’s unreasonable 
performance. And under a rule of absolute liability, if a cyberphysical system 
is subject to an insurance requirement, the insurer of that system might be at 
least initially liable for all harm caused by that system—the approach already
adopted by the United Kingdom for automated vehicles.57 
Hypothetical crashes involving a sidewalk delivery robot illustrate this 
sample framework more concretely. A jogger who kicked the robot into the 
path of a bicyclist would be liable for the bicyclist’s resulting injuries if the 
kick were deliberate but would not be liable if the kick were merely careless.
An individual who used the delivery robot to send a package would not be
liable for either but would be liable if the package improperly contained 
fireworks that caused injury by exploding in the crash. The company that 
maintained the delivery robot would be liable for injuries resulting from its 
failure to properly clean the robot’s sensors but would not be liable for 
57. Otherwise, in both the Russian Federation and the United States, it is generally not correct to
describe an insurer as directly liable for harm that the conduct or property of its insured causes to third 
parties. This third-party insurance is also distinct from first-party insurance in which the insurer 
compensates the injured policyholder. 
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injuries resulting from the robot’s failure to properly interpret data from 
those sensors. The company that developed or commercially deployed the 
robot would be liable for injuries from that interpretive failure but would not
be liable for injuries sustained by the bicyclist who crashed into the robot
deliberately kicked by the jogger. And the insurer of the robot would be 
obligated to compensate this injured bicyclist, but then entitled to recover its 
payments from the jogger through subrogation.
A liability framework could also look quite different from the example 
just illustrated. Bystanders, maintainers, developers, and owners might all be 
held to a default rule of negligence; maintainers may instead be strictly liable 
for their participation in an abnormally dangerous activity, deployers may be 
liable only for their culpable behavior, or insurers might be obligated only to 
their customers under the terms of their insurance contracts (as is typical). 
Indeed, if permitted by law, contracting parties might expand or contract the 
potential liability between them in a way that dramatically changes and even 
frustrates such a prospective liability framework. Finally, legislators or 
judges may decide that different liability rules should apply to different kinds 
of cyberphysical systems, effectively introducing a third dimension to the
chart above.58 
Any liability framework based on categorization could be criticized for 
calcifying arbitrary distinctions and fostering unnecessary complexity. 
Indeed, over the centuries American tort law has shifted—incompletely and 
imperfectly—from a system of confusing and conflicting writs to a system 
based on more general principles of reasonableness. Nonetheless, as
demonstrated in the earlier discussion, differentiation is still more the rule 
than the exception: Differences in harm, actor, relationship, and danger 
correspond to different liability rules. For this reason, refining the Russian
Civil Code’s criteria for abnormally dangerous activities with a view toward
cyberphysical systems may be a useful first step. 
At the same time, these distinctions are also united by deeper themes, 
especially trust.59 Companies that develop, deploy, and employ
cyberphysical systems in the public space ask the public for trust. This trust
is based in part on implicit or explicit representations that these companies
make to regulators, customers, and the public at large, and these
representations can in turn give rise to liabilities. If, as a condition of market
access, an entity promises that its cyberphysical system will perform 
reasonably, then the entity can be liable if the system fails to do so. For this 
reason, it may be appropriate for legislatures or regulators to require that
58.  For example, U.S. law often treats medical devices differently than other products.
 59. SMITH, supra note 44, at 7 (emphasizing the importance of the public’s trust in developers for 
the evaluation of the safety of automated driving systems). 
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every cyberphysical system have a competent entity that vouches for it. One
of us has long advocated this approach.60 It has come to play a central role
in the regulation of automated driving61 and may offer a path forward for
other cyberphysical systems as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has introduced, compared, and attempted to harmonize 
Russian and American approaches to robot liability. Both from a Russian
and from an American perspective, existing law is robust and flexible. 
Cyberphysical systems will inevitably raise questions as they inevitably
cause harm, but in many cases both the questions and the answers are not 
entirely new. 
In other words, we expect that the law will continue to bend rather than 
break. Even when courts in the Russian Federation and the United States
eventually adjudicate cases involving a runaway cyberphysical system that
is many iterations removed from its original human conception, they will be
able to reach one or more normatively responsible parties. The mechanism 
could be foreseeability, abnormally dangerous activities, common carriers,
principal-agency relationships, one of the other legal doctrines we have
discussed, or one of the many others we have not. The motivation—and, 
occasionally, a tension—will be the expectation that law itself be reasonable, 
even as what is reasonable for the law and for those subject to it continues to 
evolve.62 
60. See e.g., Bryant Walker Smith, Regulation and the Risk of Inaction, in AUTONOMES FAHREN 
593, 607 (Markus Maurer, et al. eds., 2015) (summarizing eight potential regulatory strategies proposed 
to allocate risk); Bryant Walker Smith, How Governments Can Promote Automated Driving, 47 N.M. L.
REV. 99, 128–30 (2017) (discussing regulatory changes to operator’s insurance minimums as a means of
addressing product liability concerns). 
61. See, e.g., AV START Act, S. 1885, 115th Cong. § 9 (2017) (requiring that manufacturers file 
“safety evaluation reports” with the Secretary of Transportation in unenacted bill); LAW COMM’N &
SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N, LAW COMM’N CONSULTATION PAPER 240, SCOTTISH LAW COMM’N 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 166, AUTOMATED VEHICLES: A JOINT PRELIMINARY CONSULTATION PAPER 101
(Nov. 2018), https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2018/
11/6.5066_LC_AV-Consultation-Paper-5-November_061118_WEB-1.pdf (introducing discussion of a 
recent statute’s regime for assigning civil liability for harms caused by automated vehicles); NTC
AUSTRALIA, SAFETY ASSURANCE FOR AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS: CONSULTATION REGULATION
IMPACT STATEMENT 9 (May 2018), ris.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/posts/2018/06/safety_
assurance_for_automated_driving_systems.pdf (assigning responsibility for automated vehicle safety to
the manufacturer); U.S. Automated Vehicles Activities, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
www.transportation.gov/AV (last updated Feb. 27, 2019) (voluntary safety self-assessments). 
62. Professor Sergey Alekseev has observed that the law “possesses its own enormous power, 
absorbing in itself the fundamentals of universally accepted justice.” See interv’yu zhurnalu Zakon, 
SCICENTER  (July 2009), https://scicenter.online/gosudarstvo-pravo-shpori-scicenter/sergey-sergeevich-
alekseev-dlya-prava-sdelal-77197.html (in the original Cyrillic, интервью журналу Закон). The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own 
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Finally, because civil liability focuses on problems and failures, it may
not be a particularly inspiring topic. For this reason, it is also important to 
remember the promise of these new technologies. Law will need to address 
their failures, but society will benefit from their successes.
times.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
